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INTRODUCTION 
The response to the economic recession in Europe has elicited 
different reactions from, and within, the Member States as well as the 
people affected by the economic downturn. As the election in 
February 2015 of the new government in Greece, campaigning on an 
anti-austerity election platform, has dramatically demonstrated, the 
response of the European Union (“EU” or the “Union”) to the 
economic crisis is by no means accepted as either a popular, or the 
“right,” response.1  
This Essay uses as its starting point the electioneering position 
taken by right-wing political parties, exemplified in the statement 
from Mitt Romney. For him the economic crisis in the EU has been 
                                                            
* Littleton Chambers, Temple, London. 
1. On January, 25 2015 the left-wing party, SYRIZA, won a legislative election in 
Greece but without an overall majority. It formed an “anti-austerity” coalition with the 
Independent Greeks party on the following day and subsequently has been re-negotiating the 
terms of the Troika (EU, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) bail-
out of its sovereign debt. 
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created by the continuing commitment to public intervention in 
markets and financing the national welfare state. Thus the responses 
by the EU are inadequate to address the necessary structural reforms 
to allow for economic growth: “Europe isn't working in Europe. It's 
not going to work here. I believe in America. I believe in the 
opportunity and the freedom that is American opportunity and 
freedom. I believe in free enterprise and capitalism.”2  
The theme is echoed in the electioneering by the Conservative 
Party in the United Kingdom.3 To rebut the allegation requires a 
qualitative analysis.4 This can be demonstrated in the adaptation of 
the institutional and governance structures of the EU and the way the 
EU has reacted to the economic crisis through fiscal and economic 
reform measures,5 the use of [temporary] state aid,6 an attempt at 
revitalising the single market,7 alongside the modernisation of 
                                                            
2. Mitt Romney, Remarks at the Republican Presidential Debate, (Sept. 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/republicans/8783948/Mitt-Romney-
European-socialist-policies-not-right-for-US.html. 
3. See Mark Briggs, ‘Europe Isn’t Working’ Says Cameron, EURACTIV.COM, (Mar. 17, 
2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/uk-europe/europe-isnt-working-says-
cameron-312965. 
4. A quantitative response can be seen in evaluating various economic indicators in the 
EU set out in Eurostat Reports. The Europe 2020 Strategy, adopted by the European Council 
in 2010, seeks to establish a smart, sustainable, and inclusive economy in Europe with high 
levels of employment, productivity, and social cohesion. National targets of Member States 
reflect the five ambitious objectives of the strategy which cover employment, research & 
development (“R&D”), climate change & energy, education and poverty reduction, reflecting 
their situation, to be reached by 2020. EUROSTAT, the statistical office of the EU, has 
provided a comprehensive overview with breakdowns by Member State of the progress the EU 
has made toward its 2020 targets in the publication Smarter, Greener, More Inclusive?. See 
EUROSTAT, Smarter, Greener, More Inclusive? Indicators to Support the Europe 2020 
Strategy, (2015) available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/6655013/KS-
EZ-14-001-EN-N.pdf/a5452f6e-8190-4f30-8996-41b1306f7367. 
5. See infra notes 37-75 and accompanying text. 
6. See Christian Ahlborn & Daniel Piccinin, The Great Recession and Other Mishaps: 
the Commission’s Policy of Restructuring Aid in a Time of Crisis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON EUROPEAN STATE AID LAW, 124 (Erika Szyszczak ed., 2011); see also State Aid 
Scoreboard 2014, Aid In the Context of the Financial and Economic Crisis, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html. 
7. Initiated through the Monti Report and implemented through the Single Market Act I 
and II and the Europe 2020 Programme. See Mario Monti, A New Strategy For The Single 
Market: At The Service of Europe’s Economy and Society (2010) [hereinafter The Monti 
Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_
10_05_2010_en.pdf; Europe 2020, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/
europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/eu-tools-for-growth-and-jobs/index_en.htm. 
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procurement,8 as well as modernising aspects of other aspect of state 
intervention in markets, particularly public services (welfare and 
social services) termed “Services of General (Economic) Interest” in 
EU law and policy.9  
The reaction to the economic crisis has adopted a distinctive EU 
approach, and, indeed, was part of a reform and modernisation 
process that started before the economic crisis was felt in Europe. The 
EU response has been implemented as a mixture of political and 
legislative change, the use of new governance processes and 
governance tools. Often such responses are derived from the catalyst 
of litigation at the national level, using the creative legal space of EU 
law to challenge the law and policies of the Member States. This, in 
turn, has allowed for a distinctive shift in political power in the EU: 
between the Member States inter-se and between the Member States 
and the Institutions of the EU. In tandem it has diminished the 
populist trust in the EU by reversing the attempts of recent years for 
greater accountability and democratic input in EU law and policy-
making. One aspect of this movement embraced greater involvement 
of national and local government in policy-making through the use of 
subsidiarity. In turn this has allowed the EU to adopt a new hybrid 
form of governance, based upon hard law and new processes of soft 
governance leading to a plurality and diversity of instruments and 
techniques which, to date, have escaped an adequate typology. This 
evolution may be viewed as a permanent reform of the EU, 
emphasising the flexibility of the EU to adapt its governance modes 
as part of its own ecology, based upon political survival.10  
                                                            
8. See The Monti Report, supra note 7, at 76; Council Directive 2014/24/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Public Procurement and Repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC, 2014 O.J. L 94/65; Council Directive 2014/25/EU 2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Procurement by Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, 
Transport and Postal Services Sectors and Repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, O.J. L 94/253; see 
also Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Award of 
Concession Contracts, 2014 O.J. L 94/1. 
9. See generally FINANCING SERVICES OF GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST: REFORM 
AND MODERNISATION (Erika Szyszczak & Johan Willem van de Gronden eds., 2013). For a 
typology of Services of General Interest, see Ulla Neergaard, Services of General Economic 
Interest: The Nature of the Beast, in THE CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICES OF 
GENERAL INTEREST IN EUROPE (Markus Krajewski et al. eds., 2009). 
10. Erika Szyszczak, Social Policy: A Happy Ending or a Reworking of the Fairy Tale?, 
in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY (David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 
1994). 
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One important issue that has generated academic and political 
discussion is whether the responses to the economic crisis have 
dismantled or re-invented the role of state intervention in the 
economy in Europe and the commitment to a welfare state. By taking 
two areas on EU policy, the reform of macro-policy budgetary 
surveillance and enforcement and the reform and modernisation of 
public services in the EU, the unfolding analysis will argue that the 
EU has not adhered to a strong commitment to maintaining a state 
interventionist approach to the market or a firm commitment to 
maintaining the status quo of a welfare state in Europe. But equally, 
the crisis has reinforced the need for the role of state intervention to 
be re-assessed and re-calibrated. There is a mixed and uneven 
commitment to the continued scope for national social and welfare 
systems to operate in an internal market. This has allowed for a new 
political and constitutional configuration in the EU where concepts of 
a national welfare state have been overtaken by fiscal and economic 
modernisation of economic governance structures and a process of 
modernisation. Thus, the position taken by Mitt Romney is 
challenged by a mixed academic discourse within Europe. On the one 
hand, there is a school of thought which suggests that rather than an 
adherence to a strong interventionist model of the state in Europe, 
there is a pervasive attachment to neo-liberalism.11 On the other hand, 
a different school of thought argues that the recent responses to the 
economic recession have served to weaken democratic involvement in 
policy-making as well as the commitment towards developing socio-
economic rights.12 However, by analysing recent modernisation and 
reform developments in the EU a more nuanced approach emerges. 
The structure of the Essay is as follows. The first section 
analyses the European commitment to a welfare state in the light of 
the creation of an Internal Market and the economic crisis. The 
second section addresses how the EU has set about the reform and 
modernisation of public finances in response to the economic crisis. 
The third part analyses how the EU is balancing a modernisation 
                                                            
11. See, e.g., RESILIENT LIBERALISM IN EUROPE’S POLITICAL ECONOMY (Vivien A. 
Schmidt & Mark Thatcher eds., 2013). 
12. See Paul O’Connell, Let Them Eat Cake: Socio-Economic Rights in an Age of 
Austerity, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC FINANCE, (Nolan, O’Connell & Harvey eds., 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915221; Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic 
Rights, 74 MOD. L. REV. 532 (2011) (the discussion by the same author of a tendency not to 
acknowledge judicial protection of socio-economic rights in the judicial fora by some national 
Supreme Courts). 
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agenda of reforming public services with a tougher agenda on 
reforming public finances. This section is followed by a specific case 
study of the modernisation of the procurement and financing of public 
services. 
I. THE WELFARE STATE IN THE INTERNAL MARKET  
A particular argument that is put forward to argue that the 
national welfare state is still strong in the EU is that the EU lacks 
competence to create its own supra-national welfare state or 
redistributive policies.13 This legal fact may act as a buffer towards 
too much political or judicial interaction with national welfare 
policies. Over time, opportunist litigation has used the forum of the 
European Courts14 to challenge the legitimacy of national welfare 
rules, against the free movement and competition rules of the TFEU 
(the economic or market rules of the Treaty). But, if the European 
Courts prioritised the economic law of the EU over national welfare 
rules significant regulatory gaps would form where the EU cannot 
fulfill a re-regulatory role. This is because traditionally, the 
legislative, economic, and social spheres of the EU have been 
separated, with the Member States retaining significant legislative 
competence in the social and welfare sphere.15 Article 151 TFEU16 
                                                            
13. For several years, academic research used the typology of welfare states developed 
by Esping-Andersen in GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE 
CAPITALISM (1990). This approach has been challenged from a theoretical perspective, 
alongside the challenges from the economic crisis and the recalibration of the welfare state in 
EU Member States. See Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are 
Typologies an Ideal or Realistic Strategy? (Draft Paper presented at Eur. Soc. Pol’y Analysis 
Network Conf., Sept. 6-8, 2012), available at http://www.cas.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0005/89033/Ebbinghaus_-_Stream_2.pdf. 
14. The General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”). 
15. See Erika Szyszczak, Be Careful What You Wish For in FESTSKRIFT - LIBER 
AMICARUM ET AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF RUTH NIELSEN (Jens Fejø, Ulla Neergaard, 
Christina Tvarnø & Grith Skovgaard Ølykke eds., 2013). 
16. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 151, 2012 O.J. C 326/114 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 151 of the TFEU states: 
 The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such 
as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 
and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 
shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and 
working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the 
improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between 
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting 
high employment and the combating of exclusion. 
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recognises a limited set of social objectives for the Union, but 
legislative competence and the political will is not always available to 
allow for Union social initiatives or interventions in areas governed 
by national welfare law.17  
Historically, the CJEU has been accused of prioritising 
economic concerns of European integration over social values but, 
from an early stage, has also paid lip service to demands that the 
Union should not be a purely economic union but should recognise 
social values.18 A general lack of legislative competence for the EU to 
intervene in social and welfare policies, alongside the principle of 
subsidiarity,19 has allowed the Member States to develop their own 
culturally distinct social and welfare policies and to continue with 
redistributive policies in tune with national preferences and mediated 
through national democratic processes. This would be seen as 
preferable to a diluted Union-level legislative compromise.  
However, the autonomy of the Member States to determine and 
mediate their welfare policies has been challenged in recent years 
                                                                                                                                     
 To this end the Union and the Member States shall implement measures which 
take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of 
contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Union 
economy. 
 They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of 
the internal market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also 
from the procedures provided for in the Treaties and from the approximation of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action. 
17. Two examples would be the tortuous legislative history of the Services Directive, 
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services in the 
Internal Market, 2006 O.J. L 376/36 (where numerous exclusions and safe harbours were 
created for social services), and the Patients’ Rights Directive, Directive 2011/24/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-
Border Healthcare, 2011 O.J. L 88/46. See also Erika Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, in 
SOCIAL SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST IN THE EU (Ulla Neergaard et al. eds., 2013). 
18. See Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43/75 [1976] E.C.R. 455; Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. 
Sweden, Case C-341/05 [2007] E.C.R. I-11767; International Transp. Workers’ Fed’n & 
Finnish Seaman’s Union v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05 [2007] E.C.R. I-10799. See also 
Renaud Thillaye, Gearing EU Governance Towards Future Growth: The Side-lining of 
Europe 2020 and its Worrying Consequences (Pol’y Network Paper, 2013); Frank 
Vandenroucke, Europe: The Social Challenge: Defining the Union’s Social Objective is a 
Necessity Rather than a Luxury (Observatoire Social Européen Opinion Paper No. 11, 2012). 
19. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), 2010 O.J. C 
83/01 [hereinafter TEU Post-Lisbon]; see also TEU Post-Lisbon Protocol (No. 2) on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiary and Proportionality, 2007 O.J. C 83/206. The 
Union’s social objectives include employment promotion, the development of human 
resources with a view to lasting high employment, improved living and working conditions, 
the dialogue between management and labour, proper social protection, combating poverty and 
social exclusion. 
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through a process of competence creep whereby opportunist litigation 
has used the forum of the European Courts to challenge national 
welfare rules, arguing for the prioritisation of economic law over 
national welfare law. If such prioritisation occurs a national welfare 
system can become destabilised. Litigation becomes contagious: 
litigation from one Member State may stimulate interest in litigation 
in other Member States, creating the potential for national welfare law 
to fall like a house of cards.20 So far, this has not happened in Europe. 
The European Courts have been sensitive to national democratic 
preferences and have created principles to protect national welfare 
systems from the full force of EU economic law by deploying various 
techniques. For example European Courts have found that certain 
activities are not “economic” activities and therefore not caught by 
the Treaty rules;21 or that a welfare system displays sufficient 
solidarity to either justify the non-application of the Treaty rules or to 
invoke a justification or exemption from the Treaty;22 or by the use of 
                                                            
20. Perhaps the most developed area of challenge to the organisation of national welfare 
schemes is seen in the litigation relating to patients’ rights to move to receive health care in 
another Member State. By asking the home state to pay for health care received in another 
Member State could seriously upset the financial balance of a national care system, as well as 
impact upon the supply of medical care in the home—and the host—Member State. See 
HEALTH CARE AND EU LAW (Johan van de Gronden ed., 2011); see also Stephane De La 
Rosa, The Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare or the Art of Codifying Complex Case Law, 
49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 15 (2012). 
21. Examples from the European Court’s case law include the exercise of public 
authority involving strategic services. See, e.g., Corinne Bodson v. SA Pompes funèbres des 
régions libérées, Case 30/87, [1988] E.C.R. 2479 (mooring services in ports) Corsica Ferries 
France v. Direction Général des Douanes, Case C-49/89, [1989] E.C.R. 4441 (air traffic 
control) SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-43; Selex 
Sistemi Integrati SpA. v Comm'n, Case C-481/07P, [2009] E.C.R. I-2207 (anti-pollution 
surveillance); Diego Calì & Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), 34 
Case C-343/95, [1996] E.C.R. I-1547. See also Okeoghene Odudu, Economic Activity as a 
Limit to Community Law, in THE OUTER LIMITS OF EU LAW 225-43 (Catherine Barnard & 
Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2009). 
22. See e.g., Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, Case C-355/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5263; 
Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v. Instituto nazionale per l'assicurazione contro gli 
infortuni sul lavoro (INAIL), Case C-218/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-717; Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v. 
Maschinenbau und Metall-Berufsgenossenschaft, Case C-350/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-1513; 
Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, Case C-355/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5263; Sodemare SA & 
Others v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-70/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3395; Albany International BV 
v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751; Case C-155-157/97, 
Brentjens Case C-67/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-6025; Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v. 
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven, Case C-219/97, [1999] E.C.R. 
I-6121;Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz, Case C-475/99, [2001].C.R. I-
8089; Comm'n. v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., Case C-160/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-03713; Diego Calì & 
Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), Case C-343/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-
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the derogation in Article 106(2) TFEU that the application of the 
market rules of the Treaty would prevent a Service of General 
Economic Interest from fulfilling its obligations effectively;23 or by 
allowing for Member States to justify national welfare policies 
through overriding reasons in the public interest.24  
Alongside the European Courts’ sensitivity to national welfare 
systems a door has been opened for the Commission to develop soft 
governance processes to “persuade” the Member States to modernise 
social welfare policies. This has been described as a process of 
Europeanisation as EU sites and fora emerge and processes 
stimulated to create a dialogue and a discourse at the EU level to 
persuade the Member States—and public opinion—to modernise and 
liberalise welfare and public services. This began with the evolution 
of open methods of co-ordination for social issues25 and was 
reinforced by the Commission deploying soft law. Such processes 
involve different constellations of stakeholders to drive the agenda of 
modernisation of social and public services in Europe.26  
                                                                                                                                     
1547; AGR2 Prévoyance v. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, Case C-437/09, [2011] ECR I-1003. 
See also Ulla Neergaard, In Search of the Role of “Solidarity” in Primary Law and the Case 
Law of the ECJ, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL: 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 97-138 (Ulla Neergaard & Ruth 
Nielsen eds., 2010); Malcolm Ross, The Value of Solidarity in European Public Services Law, 
in THE CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST 81-99 (Markus 
Krajewski & Ulla Neergard, eds., 2009); Tamara Hervey, “Social Solidarity”: A Buttress 
Against Internal Market Law?, in SOCIAL LAW AND POLICY IN AN EVOLVING EU 31-47 (Jo 
Shaw ed., 2000); Michael Dougan, Expanding the Frontiers of EU Citizenship by Dismantling 
the Territorial Boundaries of the National Welfare States?, in THE OUTER LIMITS OF EU LAW 
119, 199-265 (Catherine Barnard & Okeoghene Odude eds., 2009); Rob Houtepen & Ruud Ter 
Meulen, New Types of Solidarity in the European Welfare State, 8 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 
329, 329-40 (2000); Jonathan White, Rethinking Transnational Solidarity in the EU, 
PERSPECTIVES: CENTRAL EUR. REV. INTL. AFFS. 40, 40-57 (2003); NATHALIE KARAGIANNIS, 
EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY (2007). 
23. Case C-320/91, Corbeau, [1993] E.C.R. I-2563. 
24. Seen especially in the free movement area and healthcare litigation. See Vassilis 
Hatzopoulos, Financing National Health Care in a Transnational Environment: The Impact of 
the EC Internal Market, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 761, 761-804 (2009); J.M.F. Martin & Síofra 
O’Leary, Judicial Exceptions to the Free Provision of Services, in SERVICES AND FREE 
MOVEMENT IN EU LAW, 163-95 (Mads Andenas & Wulf-Henning Roth eds., 2002). 
25. See generally Peter Lelie & Bart Vanhercke, Inside the Social OMC’s Learning 
Tools: How “Benchmarking Social Europe” Really Worked 19 (OSE Paper Series Research 
Paper No.10, 2013). 
26. See Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17, at 317. For a new attempt 
at analysis of when and how soft law is used in the EU, see Fabien Terpan, Soft Law in the 
European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law, 21 EUR. L.J. 68. 
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II. THE MODERNISATION OF PUBLIC FINANCES IN THE EU 
A significant incursion into national welfare policies has 
occurred as a result of the EU response to the sovereign debt crisis. 
The crisis turned attention to the weaknesses and instability of the 
economic and monetary constitutional structure of the Union, 
particularly the weaknesses in monitoring imbalances in public 
budgets. The explanations for these weaknesses are multiple and 
involve political and governance aspects of the EU integration model. 
Realising the euro became a political end in itself, with a blind eye 
turned to the creative accounting used by some Member States to 
meet the original convergence criteria targets. But another weakness 
is that the EU is not a complete economic and monetary union 
(“EMU”), with several Member States refusing to contemplate 
membership,27 and several new Member States hastily adjusting their 
economic and fiscal policies to join the EMU as a badge of honour. 
As a consequence, Article 121 TFEU states that “Member States shall 
regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern.” This 
exposed the choices made by the Member States in balancing their 
public finances to scrutiny and was implemented through the use of 
multilateral surveillance techniques with a weak form of peer review 
and weak sanctions in the form of Recommendations.28 As a result, 
several Member States became exposed and vulnerable as the 
economic recession deepened and now have been subjected to macro-
economic reform and modernisation programmes in order to receive 
bailouts from the EU. These programmes have impacted the financing 
and delivery of welfare services in the Member States as they have 
been asked to “effectively renegotiate their basic social contracts.”29 
The response of the EU to the existing inadequacy of macro-
economic surveillance in the EMU was to introduce a new procedure 
of surveillance and enforcement called the “excessive imbalance 
procedure.”30 While these new procedures continued with the peer 
pressure approach of earlier techniques, a new remedy, or sanction, 
was introduced whereby a Member State belonging to the euro area 
                                                            
27. For example, the United Kingdom and Denmark. 
28. See generally Dariusz Adamski, National Power Games and Structural Failures in 
the European Macroeconomic Governance, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 1319, 1319-64 
(2013). 
29. J-W. Müller, Beyond Militant Democracy?, 73 NEW LEFT REV. 44 (2012). 
30. Council Regulation 1176/2011, art. 22, 2011 O.J. L 306/25; see also Council 
Regulation 1174/2011, 2011 O.J. L 306/8. 
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that does not follow a Council Recommendation is subject to a fine of 
0.1% of its GDP. This is not an automatic process. The Commission 
must issue a Recommendation finding the Member State concerned is 
affected by excessive imbalances.31 In practice, even this stage of the 
new processes is not automatic. Several Member States experiencing 
excessive budget imbalances and under macroeconomic reform 
programmes imposed as part of the conditions for obtaining financial 
assistance from the “Troika” (the IMF, the ECB, and the EU) as part 
of the financial rescue programme, notably, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, were not subject to further in-depth investigation by the 
Commission. 32 
Article 136(3) of the TFEU provides that the “granting of any 
required financial assistance . . . will be made subject to strict 
conditionality.” The depth of the economic recession and the 
exposure of a number of weak economies led to stricter emphasis 
upon the reform of welfare budgets alongside the need to modernise 
employment policies without overlooking the need for a social-
economic balance in the prescriptions handed out.33 The explanation 
for the imperative—and harshness—of the requirements to reform 
domestic economic policies is explained by Adamski as part of the 
solidarity of the EU: “This democratic dynamic explains why the 
more Germany and other creditor countries financially assist the euro 
area countries on the downside, the more they are susceptible to 
alleviate the harshness of the conditionality of assistance and the more 
ground the idea of a fiscal union gains.”34 
Furthermore, as an explanation for the weaknesses, or lacunae, 
in the supra-national powers of the Union, Adamski notes, “[b]ut it 
also instantiates a fundamental paradox of the Union’s political 
constitution. Institutions of the Union do not have enough legitimacy 
                                                            
31. See Council Regulation 1176/2011, supra note 30, art. 7(1). 
32. An explanation for the reticence to fine a Member State may be that a 
Recommendation is a non-binding instrument in EU law. See Jonathon Zeitlin, Socializing the 
European Semester? Economic Governance and Social Policy Coordination in Europe 2020, 
(Watson Inst. Int’t Stud., Brown U. Working Paper No. 17, 2014). Observing that in a public 
lecture, Judge Koen Lennaerts raised doubts as to whether sanctions under the Excessive 
Imbalances procedure of the MIP were legal, but this point was not made in the written version 
of the lecture. See Judge Koen Lennaerts, Address on Economic Integration, Solidarity and 
Legitimacy: The EU In Times of Crisis, available at https://www.kuleuven.be/euroforum/
viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=DOCS&ID=860. 
33. See S. Bekker et al., EU Governance of Economic and Social Policies: Chances and 
Challenges for Social Europe, 2 EUR. J. SOC. L. 103-20 (2013). 
34. Adamski, supra note 28, at 60. 
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to pursue structural reforms at the national level, while only 
structurally reformed Member States would not be a burden to a fiscal 
federation.”35 
The Commission recognised the absurdity of fining a Member 
State with an economy already under financial stress. More surprising 
is the fact that the Commission also chose not to find that the Member 
States of Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Slovenia, and France, which were also 
experiencing excessive imbalances, were “only” “very serious” 
imbalances in the case of Spain and Cyprus and “serious” imbalances 
in the case of France, Italy, and Slovenia. However, the lack of 
sanctions for non-compliance, alongside the deepening of the 
sovereign debt crises in some Member States, forced the political 
hand of the EU to introduce a new political and constitutional 
approach to economic governance. On March 2, 2012 twenty-five 
Member States signed a new Treaty: The Treaty on Stability, Co-
ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG).36 This Treaty created the Fiscal Compact which requires the 
signatory Member States to enact into national constitutions (or 
fundamental law) a commitment to converge progressively towards a 
structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP (0.1% for States with a debt ratio 
substantially below 60%), with compliance monitored by independent 
institutions. A different layer of enforcement is introduced in that a 
Member State may/should take legal action under Article 8(1) TSCG 
against a Member State not implementing a balanced budget. If the 
action is successful the CJEU should impose a fine, by way of a lump 
sum or penalty payment, that shall not exceed 0.1% of the GDP of the 
Member State in breach of the Treaty rules (Art. 8(2) TSCG). 
The involvement of the CJEU in the enforcement of the 
solidarity pact of the Member States moves beyond a reinforcement 
of the rule of law as an integral part of the EU integration model. It 
also reinforces the moves away from participative democracy in the 
decision-making framework of the EU. A deeper and more profound 
impact of the new constitutional structure is also noted by Damien 
Chalmers in The European Redistributive State and a European Law 
of Struggle. He argues that the effect of the Court’s new role has been 
to alter the constitutional balance in the EU to allow for the 
emergence of what he describes as a new form of redistributive 
                                                            
35. Id. 
36. The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic abstained from signing the new Treaty 
on Accession to the EU; in 2013 Croatia signed the new Treaty. 
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state.37 This new polity is described as a regulatory state where fields 
of domestic economic and fiscal policy-making have been transferred 
to “new areas of political contestation” in which other Member States 
and the EU Institutions are more heavily involved in domestic policy-
making. Chalmers perceives that this new form of polity lacks the 
conventional constraints associated with constitutional democracies 
and the rule of law, arguing that the traditional public law heritage of 
the Union, a system of accountability, democratic engagement, and 
constitutional checks and balances, has been lost to the emergence of 
a regulatory state.  
The radical nature—and permanence—of the alterations to the 
institutional balance in the Union are also analysed by Mark Dawson 
and de Witte.38 Their analysis is detailed in scope by arguing that the 
constitutional structure of the Union contains a ‘substantive’, 
‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimension that has been affected, or 
recalibrated, by the response to the economic and fiscal crisis in 
Europe.  
According to their thesis the substantive balance of the Union is 
destabilised by the manner in which citizens of the Union have lost 
ownership and authorship over core values that have culturally and 
historically shaped national values towards a welfare state.  
Both theses may be expanded by drawing upon the use of the 
economic, or market rules, of the Union being used by opportunist 
litigation to challenge core values of national law. The lack of Union 
legislative competence has not restrained the European Courts from 
acknowledging that social and welfare policies which are economic in 
nature may be mediated through EU law, primarily through the scope 
of justifications and derogations from the Treaty rules. This limits the 
autonomy of the Member States, particularly through the necessity to 
re-appraise national rules to comply with the principle of 
proportionality.  
Dawson and de Witte argue that the institutional balance of the 
Union is altered by decreasing the voice of marginalised interests and 
representative institutions.39 The loss of representative influence is 
                                                            
37. See, e.g., DAMIAN CHALMERS, THE EUROPEAN REDISTRIBUTIVE STATE AND A 
EUROPEAN LAW OF STRUGGLE, 18 EURO. L.J. 667 (2012). 
38. See generally Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU 
After the Eurocrisis, 76 MOD. L. REV. 817 (2013).  
39. See K. Lenaerts & A. Verhoeven, Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for 
Democracy in EU Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 
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seen in the development of new constellations of actors in policy-
formation fora, chosen and orchestrated by the Commission through 
soft governance processes40 and in the dominance of the executive, 
and now the CJEU, in the new fiscal surveillance and enforcement 
mechanisms of EMU. Thus the result is likely to be greater power for 
national executives, with responsibilities for the initiation of, and 
compliance with, policy proposals shifting during the economic crisis 
towards the European Council (that is, the executives of the Member 
States). This is a significant departure from the attempt towards 
encouraging a greater involvement in national parliaments in EU law-
making scrutiny and the move towards local decision-making through 
the principle of subsidiarity.41 
Finally, according to Dawson and de Witte, the marginalisation 
of certain interests is also seen in terms of the threat to the spatial 
balance of the Union, which protects the voice of smaller and poorer 
Member States and their citizens from majoritarian or even 
hegemonic tendencies. The increased influence of the bigger, more 
resourceful Member States, in combination with the changes to the 
Union’s substantive and institutional structure, leads to the loss of 
political autonomy for smaller and poorer Member States.  
The frustration of this denial of democratic participation in 
decisions affecting national interests has spilled out onto the streets of 
European cities from Lisbon to Dublin, and from Madrid to Athens. 
III. THE RECALIBRATION OF THE SOCIAL AND THE 
ECONOMIC 
The Treaty of Lisbon 2007, negotiated before the economic 
crisis, is portrayed as a significant turning point in the constitutional 
structure of the Union, signaling a qualitative change to policy 
making: a recalibration or rebalancing of the economic priorities 
found in the earlier Treaties with a set of social aims and values set 
out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”). 42 
In particular the use of the term “a highly competitive social market 
                                                                                                                                     
(C. Joerges and R. Dehousse eds., 2002); see also J. P. Jacque, The Principle of Institutional 
Balance, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 387 (2002).  
40.  See Szyszczak, supra note 17. 
41. See Adam Cygan, Accountability, Parliamentarism and Transparency, in THE EU: 
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS (2013). 
42. See Erika Szyszczak, Building A Socioeconomic Constitution: A Fantastic Object?, 
35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1364 (2012). 
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economy” in Article 3 TEU suggested the EU would intervene to 
create social policies alongside respecting the Member States’ 
commitments to social welfare policies. This would go some way to 
plugging the regulatory gaps when national law clashed with the 
fundamental economic law of the EU, as well as to ensure that a 
social dimension was part of the response to the economic crisis. But 
the ability of the EU to deliver on this promise has been questioned.43 
And, as this analysis reveals, the social dimension of European 
integration has been subsumed into the new macroeconomic 
surveillance mechanisms and economic imperatives of reform and 
modernisation. Zeitlin and Vanhercke describe the process as 
“socializing of the European Semester.”44 By this they argue that 
social policies have been absorbed into the economic co-ordination 
framework, the European Semester, through the increased focus 
social objectives as targets in EU Recommendations to the Member 
States, an increased emphasis on social monitoring and multilateral 
surveillance and peer review of Country reporting, an enhanced role 
for social and employment actors, for example, the EU Employment 
and Social Protection Committee. At the same time the Commission 
refused to engage in the Social Open Method of Coordination, 
arguing that the policy processes should be coordinated within the 
Europe 2020 process and that social reporting should be channeled 
through the European Semester.45 Zeitlin and Vanhercke argue that 
these developments are “a product of reflexive learning and creative 
adaptation by social and employment policy actors to the new 
                                                            
43. Fritz W. Scharpf, The Asymmetry of European Integration, or: Why the EU Cannot 
be a ‘Social Market Economy’, 8 SOCIOECONOMIC REV. 211 (2009); see Dragana 
Damjanovic, The EU Market Rules As Social Market Rules: Why the EU Can be a Social 
Market Economy, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1685 (2013). 
44. See Zeitlin, supra note 32. The European Semester begins in November when the 
Commission issues its Annual Growth Survey identifying key economic challenges faced by 
the EU and identifies priorities for action. The Survey reviews the Country Specific 
Recommendations from the previous year. Simultaneously the Commission issues an Alert 
Mechanism Report which identifies the Member States deemed necessary for In-Depth 
Reviews under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (which reports in March). Using the 
Annual Growth Survey the European Council in March endorses the EU and national priorities 
and provides reflections on the implementation of the previous cycle of reporting. In April the 
member States submit their Reform programmes which cover the Europe 2020 Guidelines and 
the Euro+Pact commitments, as well as the Macro Imbalances Procedure and their Stability or 
Convergence programmes. The Commission assesses these programmes in May, proposing 
Country-Specific Recommendations which are reviewed by the ECOFIN and EPSCO 
Committees and endorsed by the European Council in June/July. 
45. See id. at 29. 
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institutional conditions of the European Semester: another form of 
‘socialization.’”46 
For some commentators this is a missed opportunity to 
recalibrate and modernise the European welfare state.47 However, 
there are some countervailing pulls towards balancing the economic 
and social values of the EU. For example, a reinforcement of the 
social dimension to EU political integration can be seen in the 
incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU basic 
law, alongside greater reference to the Charter in European Court 
judgments. Contained in Articles 34-36 of the Charter is a Chapter on 
“Solidarity”, and recognising as part of the EU heritage are a set of 
welfare rights and principles common to the Member States: social 
security, social services, social housing, healthcare, and public 
services (services of general economic interest).48 
Additionally, a constitutionally entrenched boundary between 
economic and non-economic activities was created in Article 14 
TFEU where a distinction is made between public services, known as 
Services of General Economic Interest (“SGEI”) and non-economic 
services of general interest (“NESGI”). This distinction is reinforced 
in Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest (“SGI”), setting a 
means of dividing competences between the EU and the Member 
States. 
Thus the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 facilitated a bridge between 
national welfare state policies and the complementarity of a set of EU 
social welfare policies. The near absence of an EU social dimension 
in the earlier Treaties had allowed the Member States leeway in 
developing national policies on public services and protecting these 
policies from outside competition. But now, this notion of a “bounded 
space” for national welfare policies has been increasingly challenged 
by opportunist litigation testing the national welfare policies against 
EU market or economic law.49 
                                                            
46. Id. at 4. 
47. See ANTON HEMERIJCK, CHANGING WELFARE STATES (2013); see also Anton 
Hemerick, Lecture at the London School of Economics, Fault Lines and Silver Linings in the 
European Social Models (June 14, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/
publicEvents/events/2014/06/20140611t1830vNT.aspx). 
48. For a detailed commentary on the meaning and scope of the Charter, see THE EU 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff 
Kenner, Angela Ward eds., 2014). 
49. The term is used in MAURIZIO FERRERA, THE BOUNDARIES OF WELFARE (2005). 
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At EU level, initially, the emphasis upon the social dimension to 
European integration was boosted in a way that would challenge the 
integrity and structure of national welfare policies, particularly in the 
financing and demographic planning of the delivery of such services. 
The CJEU provided intellectual leadership towards creating the idea 
of a single market in welfare services by allowing individuals to 
access public services in another Member State by utilising the 
concept of Citizenship of the Union,50 replacing the traditional 
territorial boundaries with a new single market for public services.51 
However, there is a lack of symmetry in this process.52 In shaping the 
supply side of public services it has proved not to be as easy for EU 
law to open up cross-border markets, outside of the liberalisation of 
the networked industries.53 If we take one sector, healthcare services, 
the CJEU has shown that there can be incentives for competition to 
materialise in public social services, for example, by allowing patients 
seeking alternative health care in another Member State to utilise the 
free movement provisions of EU economic law.54 Despite the push for 
patients’ rights and free movement, health care supply side reform is 
largely underdeveloped at the EU level. The creation of markets in 
cross-border health care is the exception with the majority of social 
public services continuing to be provided within territorial 
boundaries. At first sight the Member States have been allowed to 
create a safe, protected laboratory to experiment with different forms 
of liberalisation, or marketisation, modernisation, and reform of such 
                                                            
50. But see Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13, [2014] 
E.C.R. I____ (delivered 2014). The CJEU placed limits on Citizenship where a migrant was 
unable to claim special non-contributory social security benefits when she was not legally 
resident in a Member State. See Jobcenter Berlin Neuköln v. Nazifa, Sonita, Valentina & 
Valentino Alimanovic, Case C-67/14, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (delivered 2015). 
51. Access to some public services has proved easier than others. See, e.g., R v. London 
Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills, ex parte Dany Bidar, Case 
C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119 (discussing education). In contrast access to public social 
security benefits has been tightened. Compare Dano Case C-333/13, with 
Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v. Brey, Case C-140/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Sept. 
19, 2013); Gryzelczck, C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-06193; Förster C-158/07 (delivered Nov. 
18, 2008). 
52. See Erika Szyszczak, Legal Tools in the Liberalisation of Welfare Markets, in 
INTEGRATING WELFARE FUNCTIONS INTO EU LAW—FROM ROME TO LISBON (Ruth Nielsen 
et al. eds., 2009). 
53. See Sodemare SA & Others v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-70/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-
3395. 
54. See generally HEALTH CARE AND EU LAW, supra note 20; De La Rosa, supra note 
20. 
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services within their own territorial and cultural space.55 This has 
been achieved through the lack of litigation to challenge certain 
sectors as well as the use of exemptions and safe havens of certain 
sensitive social services such as social housing, hospital care, or 
education created in EU secondary law and European Commission 
soft law Communications.56 However, the economic and fiscal crisis 
has created a countervailing pull to the evolution of a national-led 
social dimension to the EU by focusing the re-shaping and 
recalibration of public services as economic services, guided by 
considerations of competition and efficiency.  
The drive for the marketisation of social services is taking place 
not only through demands made by the response to the fiscal and 
economic crisis but also the marketisation processes inevitably have 
led to the application of free movement and competition law to areas 
of state activity previously shielded from the economic law of the EU.  
The need, on the one hand, to shield public services from 
competition, but, on the other hand, to ensure a level playing field 
where significant amounts of public expenditure, as well as access to 
ancillary markets is concerned, has blurred the boundaries of EU law. 
This is generating strong pressure on some of the solutions adopted 
by the CJEU when trying to protect the Member States freedom from 
the checks and balances derived from EU economic law.57 To address 
this emerging problem the European Commission has created a new 
form of governance through soft law communications to retain a 
normative dimension to EU regulation of social and welfare 
services.58 
The first attempts at modernisation of national social services 
and social security systems were initiated through soft forms of 
                                                            
55. Albert Sanchez Graells & Erika Szyszczak, Modernising Social Services in the 
Single Market: Putting the Market into the Social, in FOSTERING GROWTH: REINFORCING THE 
INTERNAL MARKET CEU EDICIONES 61-88 (J. Maíllo & J. Beneyto eds., 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326157. 
56. See Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17. But note, however, such 
sectors may not be totally immune from the fundamental Treaty rules on competition and free 
movement. See Libert v. Gouvernement flamand, Joined Cases 197/11 & 203/11, [2013] 
E.C.R. I___ (delivered May 8, 2013). Here a Flemish law on social housing was tested against 
the free movement rules. See also Diputación Foral de Bizkaia, Case T-397/12, [2015] E.C.R. 
I___ (delivered May 19, 2015). 
57. See e.g., Fenin v. Commission, Case C-205/03 P, [2006] E.C.R. I-6295; AOK 
Bundesverband, Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK) v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft 
Cordes, Joined Cases C-264/01 & 306/01 & 354/01 & 355/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-2493. 
58.  Szyszczak, Soft Law and Safe Havens, supra note 17. 
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persuasion to the Member States, through the use of 
Recommendations and discussions termed “High Level” talks 
between civil servants of the Member States. Reform of public 
services was on the modernisation agenda of the EU before the 
sovereign debt crisis added to the economic and fiscal crisis in 
Europe. In 2008 a renewed Social Policy Agenda was adopted by the 
Commission.59 This was intended to complete the limping Lisbon 
Process for the years 2008-2010 by linking employment and 
economic stability. Its aims were lost in the ensuing economic 
recession and a lack of analysis and understanding as to how social 
policy governance fitted with the new architecture for economic and 
fiscal coordination outlined in the earlier section of this Essay. 
Instead, following on from The Monti Report, the “Europe 
2020” programme was adopted by the European Council in June 
2010. This resulted in the Single Market Acts I and II which provide a 
framework for modernisation of aspects of the Single Market. Of 
significance alongside the modernisation and reform of the Single 
Market is the integration of the social dimension of EU policy 
coordination into the European Semester. In a Communication of 
2013 social indicators continue to be the predominant policy tool, 
alongside the coordination of national employment policy, in 
monitoring the Member States’ social policies.60 Similarly social 
indicators continue to be used to guide a social “open method of 
coordination” to combat poverty, pensions and long-term care in the 
Member States. The Communication suggests that the new procedure, 
the “Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure,” may create a 
surveillance mechanism to pick up imbalances that could threaten the 
EMU macroeconomic policy surveillance mechanisms. Another new 
mechanism termed the “Alert Mechanism Report” uses the indicators 
of social policy to create a Score Board to alert the Commission to 
conduct further in-depth investigations and to issue 
Recommendations accompanying the Country Specific 
Recommendations emerging from the European Semester reviews. 
This is a new dimension to the way in which social policies, that 
                                                            
59. Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Renewed Social 
Agenda: Opportunities, Access and Solidarity in 21st Century Europe COM (2008) 412 Final 
(September 2008). 
60. Communication on Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, COM (2013) 690 Final, 2014 O.J. C 67/24. 
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affect the operation of welfare states in Europe, are brought within 
macro-economic surveillance mechanisms. The subtle introduction of 
this new area of surveillance is necessary because the legal base for 
the six-pack and two-pack regulations is Article 121(6) TFEU that 
states that “[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting by 
means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance 
procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4.” 
Paragraphs Three and Four State: 
 3. In order to ensure closer coordination of economic 
policies and sustained convergence of the economic 
performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on the 
basis of reports submitted by the Commission, monitor economic 
developments in each of the Member States and in the Union as 
well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad 
guidelines referred to in paragraph 2, and regularly carry out an 
overall assessment. 
 For the purpose of this multilateral surveillance, Member 
States shall forward information to the Commission about 
important measures taken by them in the field of their economic 
policy and such other information as they deem necessary. 
 4. Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in 
paragraph 3, that the economic policies of a Member State are 
not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 
2 or that they risk jeopardising the proper functioning of 
economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a 
warning to the Member State concerned. The Council, on a 
recommendation from the Commission, may address the 
necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned. The 
Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, decide to 
make its recommendations public. 
IV. REFORM OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE EU 
The economic crisis created new challenges for the Member 
States to continue to supply and adapt public services under the 
traditional national material and financial structures. Member States 
are under significant pressure to find new ways of meeting their social 
duties with increased “efficiency,” or, in other terms, under pressure 
to achieve significant savings that allow them to remain in 
compliance (or to attain compliance) with financial stability 
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obligations without completely dismantling the welfare state. 
Although not all of the reforms are driven by efficiency arguments 
since there is evidence that quality and choice in public services has 
also been a driver.61 Other evidence from Europe indicates that a 
central driver of reform of public services is the role of the middle 
class as a central and key constituency for welfare reform.62 
Public sector reform initiatives, and specifically those concerned 
with public service provision, need to be compliant with an 
increasingly complicated web of EU economic or market rules and 
principles. Despite the increasing relevance of solidarity and the 
continued treatment of social services as a matter of exclusive 
legislative competence of the Member States, compliance with 
secondary EU legislation and with soft law instruments adopted by 
the European Commission (indirectly) bring social services within the 
sphere of EU economic law. Recent reforms in state aid and public 
procurement, emanating from the Monti Report, make it particularly 
challenging for Member States to ‘rethink and redesign’ the strategies 
for the provision and financing of public and social services.63 The 
modernisation of the funding and operation of public services in the 
EU had started at the national level in response to national political 
preferences for the reduction of state provision and funding of such 
services in several Member States,64 but most notably the United 
                                                            
61. K. Dowding & P. John, The Value of Choice in Public Policy, 87 PUB. ADMIN. 219 
(2009); JULIAN LE GRAND, THE OTHER INVISIBLE HAND: DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES 
THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION (2007). 
62. See Joan Costa-Font & Valentina Zigante, The Choice Agenda, in European Health 
Systems: The Role of ‘Middle Class Demands’ (London Sch. Econ and Pol. Sci., Paper No.82, 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2522841. 
63. In particular the Almunia Package up-dating the earlier European Commission 
Package on Altmark which regulates the financing and operation of SGEI. Commission 
Communication on the application of the European Union State Aid Rules to Compensation 
Granted for the Provision of Services of General Economic Interest, 2012 O.J. C 8/4; 
Commission Decision of December 20th on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to State Aid in the Form of Public Service 
Compensation Granted to Certain Undertakings Entrusted with the Operation of Services of 
General Economic Interest, 2012 O.J. L 7/3; Commission Communication - European Union 
Framework for State Aid in the Form of Public Service Compensation, 2012 O.J. C 8/15; 
Commission Regulation on the Application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid Granted to Undertakings Providing 
Services of General Economic Interest, 2012 O.J., L 114/8; Swap Rate Proxies, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/swap_rates_en.html. See 
generally REFORM AND MODERNISATION, supra note 9. 
64. See, e.g., A. Anell, Swedish Healthcare Under Pressure, 14 HEALTH ECON. 
September 2005, at S237; Yvette Bartholmée & Hans Maarse, Health Insurance Reform in the 
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Kingdom.65 But there is also some evidence that efficiency gains and 
demands of the European middle classes for greater choice in the 
provision of public services, particularly health care, are also 
significant drivers in the reform of public services.66 Reform in some 
Member States may act as a form of institutional arbitrage creating 
incentives for other Member States to follow.67 However, there is also 
an acknowledgement that while certain ‘hard’ public services can be 
put out to competitive tender and efficiency gains measured, for 
example the collection of waste, other ‘social’ services are regarded 
as ‘softer’ involving more complicated evaluations of quality.68 
Research from the United States shows that markets in social services 
are not competitive.69 Indeed, the EU rules on procurement of such 
social services allow for a reduction in the competition for social 
services contracts.70 Such an approach is controversial: a reduction of 
competitive pressure can lead to either a price premium or a drop in 
quality for the same price. Having fewer suppliers will also encourage 
collusion between them in smaller markets. 
This process of opening up public contracts to competition was 
Europeanised through the CJEU ruling in Altmark,71 which 
established a set of ex ante criteria for the legitimate funding of public 
services. This was an indication of a prescriptive approach for the 
Member States to adopt in the design and delivery of public services 
and was far-reaching given that the EU did not have competence to 
legislate in the area. Such services were brought within the remit of 
                                                                                                                                     
Netherlands, 12 EUROHEALTH 7, (2006); Laura Cabiedes & Ana Guillén, Adopting and 
Adapting Managed Competition: Healthcare Reform in Southern Europe, 52 SOC. SCI. MED. 
12015 (2001). 
65. Social (Welfare) Services are also subject to reform, resulting is less direct provision 
of public services by local government and increased ‘marketisation’ of such services. See, 
e.g., MUTUALS TASKFORCE, PUBLIC SERVICE MUTUALS: THE NEXT STEPS 6 (2012), available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61776/Public
-Service-Mutuals-next-steps.pdf; HM GOVERNMENT, OPEN PUBLIC SERVICES 9 (2012), 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
255288/OpenPublicServices-WhitePaper.pdf. 
66. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in READINGS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 
(Nicole Woosley Biggart ed., 2008). 
67. See Cabiedes & Guillén, supra note 64. 
68. See David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatisation in Contracting for Social 
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the market rules by case law and taken up by the Commission in a 
quasi-legislative package to manage the administration of the effect of 
the market rules on public services. This prescription was further 
defined and refined by the Commission in a set of soft law 
documents: the Monti-Kroes package. Thus, Altmark can be situated 
within the line of case law that state monopolies are no longer 
privileged undertakings in the EU operating in a sui generis market.72 
Public services can be (and now often are) economic activities that 
are delivered in competitive markets and the EU economic (or 
market) rules of free movement and completion can be used to foster 
efficiency and consumer satisfaction. 
A parallel aspect of Altmark was a response to a need to increase 
efficiency in the delivery of public services in Europe in response to 
increasing international competiveness. Thus through judicial 
intervention efficiency and competiveness were introduced as core 
values in the delivery of public services in the EU but fine-tuned in a 
distinctive European manner to also protect the interests and values 
underpinning the role of public services (SGEI) in the EU. 
A review of the Altmark ruling was already on the agenda for 
2009.73 The Member States had hoped for greater recognition of the 
recalibration of the social and the economic balance values in EU law 
and policy from Treaty of Lisbon 2007, and, in particular a 
recognition that social services could be ring-fenced from interference 
from EU law by being provided at the local level or national level and 
not fully exposed to market principles. But the impetus from the 
Commission’s review of the single market, recognising new ideas of 
citizenship and solidarity, and the Monti Report,74 influenced the 
Commission to bring SGEI into the main frame of the new single 
market programme with tougher conditions on the entrustment of a 
public service and tighter fiscal controls to avoid over-compensation 
of SGEI. This has focused attention on economic efficiencies of 
public services rather than quality. In parallel the Commission has 
used soft law processes to indicate to the Member States how and 
                                                            
72. The death knell of State monopolies sounded in the early 1990s, on the eve of the 
deadline set of the completion of the internal market. See Höfner v. Macrotron, Case C-41/90, 
[1991] E.C.R. I-2010, ¶ 43. Since that case very few cases have been taken using Article 
106(1) TFEU as a legal base. But, recently the European Commission and the CJEU showed 
that the Article 106 TFEU is not redundant. See Commission v. DEI, Case C-533/12P, [2014] 
E.C.R. I___ (delivered July 17, 2014). 
73. See Commission Decision No. 2005/842/EC 2005 O.J. L 312/29. 
74. See id. 
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when social services may continue to be outside the capture of EU 
law, and this in turn allows for a prescriptive agenda to emerge: the 
Member States are left in little doubt that if they resort to the 
marketisation of any public or social services they run the risk of the 
EU market rules applying.75 
These interventions by the EU reflect the increased interest in 
the marketisation of public and social services in Europe, especially 
in the United Kingdom. The adoption of ‘competition-based’ 
solutions or ‘market-oriented’ formulae for the provision of social 
services implies the necessity to overcome a set of EU regulatory 
hurdles (or controls) at different stages of the process of turning 
public services into market-oriented services. Such controls make it 
difficult for Member States to seek efficiency gains without resorting 
to the (private) market and, consequently, limit their choices and 
strategies as soon as there is any type of private participation 
(generally, by means of financial transfers, acquisition of ownership 
or conclusion of contracts). Unless Member States rearrange their 
schemes for the provision of public services without any private 
participation whatsoever, EU economic law will apply, generating a 
complicated regulatory landscape that may impose significant 
restrictions on the Member States’ competence to autonomously 
choose how to provide public services under the new market-based 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The elements of solidarity seen in the acceptance of sovereign 
debt bailouts funded by the EU, (and the IMF and ECB), for Member 
States undergoing complex economic problems reveals the flexibility 
in the EU governance framework to adapt to times of crisis and goes 
some way to demonstrate that the “EU is working” in its response to 
the economic crisis. Austerity is rarely accepted as a popular solution 
and in some Member States has led to even greater social and 
economic problems. Hall has argued that the public objectives of the 
European austerity programmes are not clear: 
                                                            
75. For a general discussion of the persuasive use of soft law, see generally Szyszczak, 
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procurement and the internal market services, SWD (2013) 53 Final (Apr. 29, 2013) at 20 
(2013). 
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 It is not the reconstruction of productive capacity, full 
employment, or the development of the shared benefit of the 
welfare state, but rather the goal of sound fiscal soundness, 
formalised in targets for government debt and deficit, and the 
ability to borrow and repay, in international financial markets. 
. . . austerity is focussed primarily on public spending, rather than 
consumer spending (reinforced by the objective of focussing on 
the management of public rather than private, debt).76 
This distinctive EU response has met with deeper and more 
complex criticism and opposition in the way that it has challenged the 
constitutional settlement of the Union and altered its values. The use 
of legal measures to create a tougher framework for macroeconomic 
surveillance of public finances in the EU has resulted in a new 
constitutional and institutional arrangement whereby the executive of 
the larger, and financially stronger, Member States wield a bigger 
voice and power over weaker and less financially secure States. 
Within this new framework democratic participation and consultation, 
alongside judicial review, transparency and accountability have been 
sacrificed, allowing the voice—and the values—of the stronger 
Member States to play a significant role in creating a new national 
policy framework for the economically, and weaker states.  
While it is argued that these States have lost control over their 
social contract it is not necessarily the case that the social contract has 
been dismantled. However, the de-politicalisation of these processes 
and measures has masked the lack of a democratic involvement in the 
modernisation and reform of the welfare states of Europe. Inherent 
within that policy reform process is the inevitable reduction of 
publicly provided or publicly financed services. While this may 
eventually lead to the weakening of the traditional welfare state in 
some European states this Essay has shown, that this aspect of reform 
and modernisation of the role of State intervention in the market is not 
wholly generated by the responses to the economic crisis. Such 
policies have been on-going and are also generated by other processes 
that are also not inherently democratic. The most extreme aspect of 
the non-democratic recalibration of national public welfare services is 
the ability to litigate to challenge and test national public welfare 
services against the free market or economic rules of the EU. The 
                                                            
76. David Hall, Services of General Interest under Regimes of Fiscal Austerity, in 
SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST BEYOND THE SINGLE MARKET: EXTERNAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIMENSIONS (M. Krajewski ed., forthcoming 2015). 
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ensuing case law alters not only the constitutional balance between 
the EU-Member State legislative competence settlement but also 
accelerates the ensuing EU competence creep. Applying the EU 
economic rules to public services through soft law and soft 
governance processes alters the inter-institutional constitutional 
balance within the EU. To date this has not led to the breakup of the 
EU, or the dismantling of the welfare state in Europe, but a 
recalibration of the way in which the social contract in Europe is 
made.  
